Introduction
A key issue coming out of recent economic events is the size of fiscal multipliers when the economy is in recession. In a recent paper (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011) , we extended the standard Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) methodology in three ways to shed light on this issue. First, using regime-switching models, we estimated effects of fiscal policies that can vary over the business cycle, finding large differences in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions. Second, we estimated multipliers for more disaggregate spending variables which behave differently in relation to aggregate fiscal policy shocks, with military spending having the largest multiplier. Third, we showed that controlling for real-time predictions of fiscal variables tends to increase the size of the multipliers in recessions.
In this paper, we extend our previous analysis in two important ways. First, we estimate multipliers for a large number of OECD countries, rather than just for the United States, again allowing for state dependence and controlling for information provided by predictions. Second, we adapt our previous methodology to use direct projections rather than the SVAR approach to estimate multipliers, to economize on degrees of freedom and to relax the assumptions on impulse response functions imposed by the SVAR method. Our findings confirm those of our earlier paper. In particular, multipliers of government purchases are larger in recession, and controlling for real-time predictions of government purchases tends to increase the estimated multipliers of government spending in recession.
Methodology
Before developing our current approach, we review the one taken in our earlier paper. We developed what we referred to there as a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR), based on the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models developed in Granger and Teravistra (1993) ; one important difference in our approach is that we allow not only differential dynamic responses but also differential contemporaneous responses to structural shocks. Our basic specification, without controlling for real-time predictions, was:
where ′ is a vector of the logarithms of real government purchases ( , taxes net of transfers ( , and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP, ), observed at a quarterly frequency;
z is an indicator of the state of the economy, normalized to have zero mean and unit variance;
and the matrices and representing the VAR coefficients and variance-covariance matrix of disturbances in two regimes, recession (i = R) and expansion (i = E). The weights assigned to each regime for a given observation weighting function F(·) vary between 0 and 1 according to the contemporaneous state of the economy, z, which we took to be a moving average of real GDP growth.
In our earlier paper, we considered a variety of approaches to extend this basic model to take account of real-time information regarding expectations of fiscal variables and GDP, available from a variety of sources. One of these approaches, which we will use in this paper, was to include a direct measure of the unanticipated component of government purchases, equal to the difference between actual purchases and the forecast of this variable one period earlier,
|
. This forecast is typically taken from a survey of professional forecasters, projections prepared by government or international agencies (e.g., Greenbook forecast prepared by the Federal Reserve staff) or other credible sources (e.g., financial markets). Specifically, we estimated the SVAR for ′ where is the forecast error computed as the difference between forecast series and actual, first-release series of the government spending growth rate.
1 By stacking first in the SVAR, we could then estimate directly from the SVAR coefficients the multipliers for unanticipated government purchases.
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In contrast to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) focusing only on the U.S.
macroeconomic time series, in this paper we use data on multiple countries available from the OECD, for which consistent measures of actual and forecast values are available only at a semiannual frequency, rather than quarterly. This lower frequency of observations, in conjunction with the availability of data starting at a later date than our data for the United
States, substantially reduces the number of observations we have for any particular country. For such short time series, our original approach, which involves highly nonlinear estimation of a large number of parameters, would be very challenging. Therefore, we modify our approach in two ways. First, we use panel estimation, allowing intercepts to vary by country but constraining other coefficients to be the same. Second, rather than estimating the entire system of equations in the STVAR and using these to estimate impulse response functions (IRFs), we estimate the IRFs directly by projecting a variable of interest on lags of variables entering the VAR or more generally variables capturing information available in a given time period. This single-equation approach has been advocated by Jorda (2005) , Stock and Watson (2007) , and others as a flexible alternative which does not impose dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and which can conveniently accommodate nonlinearities in the response function. For example, when we use GDP as the dependent variable, the response of at the horizon h is estimated from the following regression:
1 We compare forecasts to contemporaneous measures to take account of subsequent data revisions.
2 Because this SVAR includes a forecast of a variable in addition to standard macroeconomic variables, this approach is also known as the expectations-augmented VAR, or EVAR. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) where changes in spending are projected on professional forecasts to construct a series on unanticipated innovations in spending. Observe that by controlling for information contained in lags of and we purify of any predictable component that would have been eliminated had the professional forecaster run a VAR. The fact that we include government spending shock dated by time is consistent with the recursive ordering of government spending first in the VARs.
In the STVAR or standard VAR analysis of how government spending shocks affect the economy, the impulse response is constructed in two steps. First, the contemporaneous responses are derived from a Cholesky decomposition of in equation (3) with government spending ordered first. In Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) we allowed contemporaneous responses to vary since can change over the business cycle. Second, the propagation of the responses over time is obtained by using estimated coefficients in the lag polynomials such as and in equation (1) applied to the contemporaneous responses from the first step.
The direct projection method effectively combines these two steps into one. describe the behavior of the system in response to a structural, serially uncorrelated shock. Indeed, if we abstract from variation in initial conditions at time , we effectively regress a variable of interest at time on a shock in a given regime at time and thus we obtain an average response of the variable of interest periods after the shock, which is precisely the definition of an impulse response.
This estimation method has several advantages over our earlier approach. First, it involves only linear estimation, if one fixes (as we have throughout our work) the parameter in expression (4). Second, it obviates the need to estimate the equations for dependent variables other than the variable of interest (e.g., GDP) and thus we can significantly economize on the number of estimated parameters. Third, it does not constrain the shape of the IRF, rather than imposing the pattern generated by the SVAR. (Under the maintained assumption that the SVAR is correctly specified, the patterns should be the same.) Fourth, the error term in equation (5) is likely to be correlated across countries. This correlation would be particularly hard to handle in the context of nonlinear STVARs but is easy to address in linear estimation by using e.g. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) (e.g., , will be lower if the response of output to government spending shocks is smaller during expansions than during recessions). In contrast, using the system in (1) requires that we explicitly model the dynamics of .
Similar to our earlier paper, is based on the (standardized) deviation of the output growth rate (moving average over 1.5 years) from the trend. However, in contrast to the earlier paper, we allow the trend to be time-varying because several counties exhibit low frequency variations in the growth rates of output. Specifically, we extract the trend using the HodrickPrescott filter with a very high smoothing parameter 10,000 so that the trend is very smooth. Because identification of the curvature in the transition function F() is based on highly nonlinear moments and thus is potentially sensitive to a handful of unusual observations, we follow our earlier approach and calibrate 1.5 so that a typical economy spends about 20 percent of the time in a recessionary regime, which is consistent the fraction of recessionary periods in the United States.
The linear analogue of specification (5) is given by ) where the response of Y is constrained to be the same for all values of ; i.e.,
, for all and .
Data
The macroeconomic series we use in our analyses come from the OECD's Statistics and Projections database. There are several benefits of using these data. First, macroeconomic series and forecasts for these series are prepared using a unified methodology so that series are comparable across countries. Second, the OECD prepares semiannual forecasts for key macroeconomic variables such as GDP and government spending in June and December of each year. The OECD's forecasts are available for a broad array of variables. Third, these forecasts have "reality checks," as the OECD exploits its local presence in the member countries and holds extensive discussions on the projections and related analyses with local government experts and policy makers. Thus, the OECD's forecasts incorporate a great deal of local knowledge and information about future policy changes. Fourth, in recent assessments of the OECD's forecasts, Vogel (2007) and Lenain (2002) report that these forecasts have a number of desirable properties and perform at par with the forecasts prepared by the private sector. More information on these forecasts is available at the OECD's website.
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The OECD's forecasts are consistently available since 1985 for "old" members of the OECD (e.g., the United States) and since the mid-1990s for newer members (e.g., Poland). The downside of using the OECD projections is that, for most of the available sample, they are 3 http://www.oecd.org/faq/0,3433,en_2649_33733_1798284_1_1_1_1,00.html available only at the semiannual frequency rather than the quarterly frequency more commonly used in the SVAR literature.
Consistent with the OECD definitions and the previous literature on fiscal multipliers, our government spending series is the sum of real public consumption expenditure and real government gross capital formation. That is, it does not include imputed rent on the government capital stock, as is now the convention in the U.S. national income accounts. In addition to the standard real GDP series, we will examine responses of other key macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks. First, we document responses of other components of GDP: real private consumption, real private gross capital formation, real exports and imports. Second, we investigate the behavior of the variables describing the labor market: total employment in the economy, employment in the private sector, the unemployment rate, and the real compensation rate in the private sector. This last series is our measure of real wages. Finally, we explore how prices, measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deflator, respond to government spending shocks. All variables except the unemployment rate enter specification (5) in logs.
Results

A. Impulse responses in a VAR and direct projections method
As a first pass through the data, we examine how our approach of direct projections compares with the more conventional approach of using VARs to construct impulse responses. Figure 1 contrasts the impulse response of output to a one-percent increase in government spending in a linear bivariate VAR-which includes real GDP and real government spending as endogenous variables and country fixed effects with slopes assumed to be the same across countries-with the impulse response of output to the same shock in government spending in the specification given by (5'), which is restricted to have the same responses and dynamics in recessions and expansions. Note that, since the linear VAR uses a Cholesky decomposition, the contemporaneous responses have to be the same in these two approaches. However, even when we extend the horizons, the responses are remarkably similar across approaches and thus we can be more confident that our subsequent results are not driven by using an alternative approach to construct impulse responses.
B. Predictability of VAR shocks
A key assumption in the construction of fiscal multipliers is that shocks to government spending are not forecastable. VARs try to ensure unforecastability of shocks by including sufficiently many lags of endogenous variables so that the error term is orthogonal to information contained in the past values of macroeconomic variables. However, as has been discussed extensively in the literature (see e.g. Ramey 2011), many changes in fiscal variables are anticipated and lagged values of the few variables included in the VAR may fail to capture these anticipated future changes.
To assess the extent to which VAR shocks are forecastable, we perform the following exercise. First, we project growth rates of government spending predicted by the OECD forecasts on the lags of endogenous variables in the VAR to remove the component of government spending growth that is predictable on the basis of information contained in the VAR. Second, we compute the error term in the government spending equation in the VAR with the same number of lags of endogenous variables -the standard VAR shocks. Third, we check the correlation between these two series, which should be zero if the OECD forecasts do not have systematically better information than is contained in the lagged variables of the VAR. In fact, we find ( Figure 2 ) that the VAR shocks are predicted by professional forecasters to a significant degree: the correlation between the two series is 0.36. In other words, a considerable part of the VAR shocks to government spending is anticipated by the OECD forecasts. This suggests that estimates of impulse responses in the conventional VAR approach may be seriously biased, as the responses to anticipated and unanticipated shocks, in theory, can be radically different.
To minimize the contamination of government spending shocks with predictable changes, we will project the forecast errors of the OECD government spending forecasts on the lags of output (or any other endogenous variable of interest, e.g., private consumption) and government spending and take the residual from this projection as a government spending shock, i.e., in specification (5). The responses of output (Panel A) are remarkably different across regimes and models.
In the linear model, only the contemporaneous response is positive and marginally statistically significant. For the next two periods, the response is positive but not statistically different from zero and then the point estimates of the response turn negative although we cannot reject the null that these responses are zero. In contrast, the response of output in the recessionary regime is robustly positive up to two years. If we use the sample-period U.S. average ratio of government purchases to output ( 5.12) to convert percentage changes into dollar changes, the maximum size of the government spending multiplier is about 3.5 with the 90% confidence interval being (0.6, 6.3). The average government spending multiplier over three years is about $2.3. The response of output in the expansionary regime is much weaker, in fact negative at some horizons, but generally we cannot reject the null that the response is zero for most horizons. This result is consistent with our earlier work for the United States where we estimated the spending multiplier
to be approximately zero in expansions and about 1.5-2.0 in recessions. This finding is also consistent with the estimates reported in the nascent literature that explores cyclical variation of fiscal multipliers. For example, Bachmann and Sims (2011) report that the spending multiplier is approximately zero in expansions and approximately 3 in recessions. Using state-level variation in government spending, Shoag (2011) finds that the multiplier is approximately 3.0-3.5 when labor markets have a slack, which could interpreted as a recessionary regime, and only approximately 1.5 when there is no slack, which could interpreted as an expansionary regime.
Finally, government spending shocks in the linear model have some effect on output. Consistent with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the literature that followed, the multiplier is about one if we continue to use the U.S. average ratio of government purchases to output ratio as above. It is clear, however, that the linear model can considerably underestimate the stimulating power of government spending in recessions and overstate it in expansions.
One may be concerned that we find a strong response of output to government spending shocks in recessions because these shocks systematically occur in periods when an economy starts to recover so that one can find a positive correlation between output growth and government spending shocks. Note that we use professional forecasts to purge predictable movements in government spending. Thus, if there is any systematic pattern in how government spending reacts to the state of the economy, we remove this correlation. We also find no statistically or economically significant correlation between our government spending shocks and measures of the state of a business cycle (e.g., ) or changes in that state (e.g., Δ ).
In other words, when the economy is in a recession or is starting to move into an expansion, a contractionary government spending shock is as probable as an expansionary government spending shock. Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by a particular timing of government spending shocks.
The first rows of Tables 1 and 2 These differential responses of output naturally raise the questions about the channels of amplification and propagation of government spending shocks through the economies. To get a sense of the basic mechanisms behind these responses, we examine in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure   4 , which corresponds to Table 1, Finally, Panels J and K show the response of the price level as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and GDP deflator respectively. Generally, government spending shocks lead to inflationary contemporaneous responses in expansions and deflationary responses in recessions. At the longer horizons we cannot reject the null that the response of the price level is zero in either of the regimes. These responses are largely consistent with the idea that prices may be relatively inflexible in the short run and most of the adjustment occurs via quantities.
D. Robustness and sensitivity analysis
In the baseline formulation of the empirical model, we use a moving average of the output growth rate to measure the state of the business cycle in a given economy. The key advantage of using this variable is that the growth rate of output is a coincident indicator. However, Keynesian theories rely on the notion of slack as a stock variable (e.g., how many workers are unemployed) rather than a flow variable (e.g., output growth rate or how many workers are hired or fired). Since the moving average is computed over 1.5 years and thus it is cumulative to some extent, one can interpret it as capturing output gap and thus a degree of slack in the economy.
Perhaps more importantly, commonly used stock variables such as unemployment rate or CBO's potential output measure typically lag the business cycle; thus these variables may provide a wrong sense of where an economy happens to be. Indeed, a high unemployment rate can extend well into a strong expansion. In any case, one may want to verify that using more direct measures of slack yields similar results. Table 3 reports estimates of the output response to government spending shocks when we use alternative indicators of slack: i) the output gap computed as the deviation of log output from a trend; ii) the detrended unemployment rate; iii) the detrended log employment level; iv) the detrended change in the unemployment rate; v) the detrended change in employment. In all cases, we detrend series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 10,000.
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While the first three measures are explicitly stock variables, the last two measures are aimed to capture acceleration in an economy. Irrespective of which measure we use, the response in a recession is larger than the response in an expansion. Furthermore, we observe that the response in recession tends to be stronger when we focus on the acceleration measures of the business cycle. In other words, the response of output seems to be larger when an economy starts to contract than when it reaches a bottom. We conclude that cyclical variation in the output responses is robust across a variety of variables measuring the state of business cycle.
Since we have significant variation in macroeconomic characteristics across countries and time, we can explore how some key characteristics are correlated with the size of government spending multipliers. We will examine four characteristics: the level of government debt (as a percent of GDP), openness to trade (mean tariff), an index of the strength of collective relations laws, and an index of labor market regulations. Our approach will be based on the following modification of equation (5):
where is a macroeconomic dimension we would like to study. Coefficients , and , describe the response of Y to a government spending shock when 0 (e.g., the debt-GDP ratio is zero), while
describe the response of Y to a government spending shock when 1 (e.g., the debt-GDP ratio is 1). Likewise, we estimate the linear analogue of specification (6) as follows: 6 We prefer this value of the smoothing parameter to 400, which is a more conventional value in the literature for semi-annual data, because a larger value ensures that the trend in the Hodrick-Prescott filter does not follow cyclical fluctuations in the series. For example, with 400, the Great Recession does not look like a deep contraction, as the trend significantly falls along with the actual output. In contrast, 10,000 does not produce this counterintuitive result. In any case, our qualitative and, to a large extent, quantitative results are insensitive to the choice of . economies have lower multipliers. Indeed, we find (not shown) that controlling for government debt tends to move the variation in the right direction although it does not resolve the puzzle completely. Thus, a positive correlation between openness and the size of the fiscal multiplier in a recession may be driven by an omitted variable.
One may also expect that a high rigidity of labor markets is likely to lead to more rigid wages and hence amplified responses of output to demand shocks (e.g., Cole and Ohanian (2004) , Gorodnichenko, Mendoza and Tesar (2009) ). We use two measures of labor market rigidities constructed in Botero et al.'s (2004) . The first is an index of protection of labor relations. This index aggregates various dimensions of union strength such as legislative rights to establish unions, to organize strikes, and to collectively bargain. The second index, which we call "labor market regulation," measures how easy it is to fire/hire workers, to increase/decrease hours of work, and to engage in alternative labor contracts (mainly use temporary and part-time workers). We find that as the rigidity in the labor market rises (i.e., either index increases), the output response in recession increases and the cyclical variation in the fiscal multiplier becomes more pronounced. This pattern is consistent with the view that more rigid labor markets can result in enhanced effectiveness of government spending shocks to stimulate output during a downturn.
Overall, we find that variation in the size of the fiscal multiplier is consistent with basic predictions of macroeconomic theory although one should be careful in interpreting the results.
Some correlations between macroeconomic dimensions and the size of the fiscal multiplier may be driven by omitted variables. One may also need a more nuanced view on what determines the size of fiscal multipliers.
E. Discussion
In general, the responses we estimate for key macroeconomic variables are remarkably consistent with the Keynesian view that the size of spending multipliers should vary over the business cycle with fiscal policy being more effective (i.e., larger multipliers) in recessions than in expansions. Interestingly, Gali et al. (2007) argue that new Keynesian models are typically unable to generate an increase in private consumption after a government spending shock.
Furthermore, spending multipliers rarely exceed one even in new Keynesian models. In many respects, new Keynesian models are similar to neoclassical models that emphasize crowding out of private consumption by increased government spending. Recently, Woodford (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011) showed theoretically in new Keynesian models that government spending shocks can have large multipliers when zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates is binding. Using high-frequency data on interest, inflation and exchange rates, Wieland (2011) provides some empirical support for the spending multipliers to exceed one when there is a binding ZLB. However, the upper bound on multipliers found by Wieland is typically about 1.5, which is considerably smaller than suggested by the theoretical results of Woodford (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011) . Furthermore, binding ZLB episodes during recessions have been very rare in modern history and thus it is hard to extend this argument more generally to recessions.
The discrepancy between the old and new Keynesian views on the effects of government spending shocks is striking. We conjecture that in part this discrepancy stems from the fact that the notion of slack is largely absent from the new Keynesian models. Indeed, despite having some frictions, new Keynesian models effectively impose clearing factor and product markets and thus there is no spare capacity (or slack) in these model economies. In contrast, old
Keynesian models emphasized that markets may not clear at all times and especially in recessions so that crowding out of private consumption or investment by government spending increases in recession can be minimal.
Concluding remarks
During the Great Recession, countries around the world adopted expansionary fiscal policies aimed at counteracting the large negative shocks to their economies. These actions occurred in spite of skepticism among many economists about the potential of fiscal policy to stimulate economic activity. In the United States, at least, the stage for this active course for fiscal policy was already set by earlier policy developments, which showed a marked increase in fiscal policy activism earlier in the decade (Auerbach and Gale, 2009 ).
The results in this paper and those in our earlier one suggest that fiscal policy activism may indeed be effective at stimulating output during a deep recession, and that the potential negative side effects of fiscal stimulus, such as increased inflation, are also less likely under these circumstances. These empirical results call into question the results from the new Keynesian literature, which suggests that shocks to government spending, even when increasing output, will crowd out private economic activity. While there has been some recent progress providing a rationale for large multipliers when economies confront a binding zero lower bound on interest rates, our findings apply to more general recessionary conditions, and thus present a challenge for the development of new models that, like the simple traditional Keynesian model, can encompass positive fiscal multipliers for private activity. (5) and (5'). For unemployment, columns (4)- (6) show the minimal response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Government receipts are nominal. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (5) and (5'). For unemployment, columns (4)-(6) show the minimal response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (5) for alternative choices of the variable z which captures the state of the business cycle. Output gap and Employment gap are computed as deviation from Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameters 10,000. Change in unemployment rate and Growth rate of employment are detrended the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameters 10,000. All data are semi-annual. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (6) and (6'). Level of government debt is measured as percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Openness to trade is the mean tariff measured in percent of value of traded goods (Source: World Bank). Protection of collective relations is an index ranging from zero (weak protection of collective labor relations) to one (high protection). This index is from Botero et al. (2004) . Labor market regulation is an index raging from zero (low regulation) and one (high regulation). This index is from Botero et al. (2004) . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Tables   Table A1. Mean and maximum response (over one year horizon) to an unanticipated one percent government spending shock. (4)- (6) show the minimal response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Government receipts are nominal. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (4)- (6) show the minimal response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Appendix: Additional
